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Summary findings
Fink, Mattoo,  and Rathindran examine the liberalization  negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in
of the basic telecommunications sector in Asian countries  Services (GATS). The new round  therefore faces the
with a view to identifying good policy and determining  challenge of not merely harvesting unilateral
how multilateral negotiations can promote  it. They find  liberalization, as in the past, but of negotiating away
that most Asian governments, despite the move away  existing restrictions.
from traditional public monopolies, are still unwilling to  Since quantitative restrictions on the number of
allow unrestricted entry, eliminate limits on private and  telecommunications service suppliers are pervasive,
foreign ownership, and establish strong, independent  deepened GATS rules could help ensure transparent  and
regulators. But where comprehensive reform has been  nondiscriminatory allocation of licenses. There may also
undertaken-including  privatization, competition, and  he a need to sharpen the regulatory principles established
regulation-the  availability of main lines, the quality of  in the last round and to create rules that safeguard not
service, and the productivity of labor are significantly  only the rights of foreign suppliers but also those of
higher.  consumers.
Somewhat surprisingly, little unilateral liberalization
has occurred since the last round  of telecommunications
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The dynamism  of global telecommunications  markets  is widely attributed  to rapid technological
development  and  an  increasingly  liberal  policy  environmnent.  Over  the  past  decade,  a  large
number  of  Asian  economies  have  also  embarked  on  reform  paths,  and  witnessed  significant
expansion  of  their  telecommunication  networks  and  striking  improvements  in  quality.  But
neither performance  nor policy have been uniform  across the region.  Countries  differ in both the
sequence  and  extent  of  reform.  Furthermore,  it  is not  always  apparent  where  the  improved
performance  is because  of specific policy  choices  rather  than  in spite  of them,  and where  more
could have  been achieved had policy been  different.
This  paper  addresses  two  questions.  Is  it  possible  to  identify  the  constituents  of  good
telecommunications  policy?  And is it possible to further the choice of good policy at the national
level  through  multilateral  negotiations?  Telecommunications  liberalization  is  a  complex  and
relatively  new  process.  Choices  have  to  be  made  regarding  the  privatization  of  state-owned
telecommunications  operators,  the introduction  of competition,  the opening of markets  to foreign
investment  and  the  establishment  of  pro-competitive  regulations.  While  there  is  growing
consensus  that each of these  elements  is desirable,  it is a rare country that has immediately  gone
all the way on all fronts.  In Asia, in particular,  governments  have differed in their willingness  to
concede  control  to the market,  and most  have a penchant  for gradualism.  Competition  has been
introduced,  but the number  of firms has been  fixed by policy;  privatization  is often partial  and
there are limits on foreign participation;  separate regulators  have been created but they are rarely
fully independent.
Even though  economic  theory is bold in its pronouncements  on the extremes, it is more tentative
in  its  prescriptions  on  the  transition  path.  How  much  greater  are  the  social  benefits  if
privatization  is accompanied  by competition?  How much greater are the benefits  if all barriers  to
entry are removed  in markets  where  some competition  has already been  introduced?  How much
competition  is  desirable-is  there  no  good  reason  to  limit  entry?  How  far  should  foreign
investment  be encouraged  in concentrated  markets?  How important  is an independent  regulator
for  the  emergence  of  robust  competition?  What  should  the  regulator  regulate?  How  is  any
adverse  impact  of liberalization  on  income  distribution  and poverty  best  addressed?  There  is a
surprisingly  long  list  of  questions  to  which  we  cannot  yet  provide  definitive  answers,  though
there is no dearth of strong opinions.
Fortunately,  the telecom  reform  process  is now  old enough to have produced  the data needed to
analyze  the implications  of alternative  policy choices.  In its analysis  of policy and performance
in  the  Asian  countries,  this  paper  draws  upon  a  database  on  telecommunications  policy  and
regulation  that  has  been  recently  created  by  the  World  Bank  in  collaboration  with  the  ITU.'
While  there  are numerous  valuable  case  studies  of the  telecom  sector  of Asian  countries,  this
' This database combines responses to government surveys  conducted by the International Telecommunication
tJnion (ITU) from 1995-1999 with market reports from Pyramid Research, operational documents from the World
Bank, information from national regulators, and various other publications.
2database makes possible, as far as we know, the first rigorous analyses of the link between policy
and performance over time across a number of Asian countries. At the present stage, however,
only the most basic hypotheses about policy can be tested.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which emerged from the Uruguay Round,
is the first multilateral effort to harness and further the liberalizing trend in services trade.  And
the results of the basic telecommunications negotiations were perhaps the most important results
of the last round of negotiations that ended two years ago.  Another round has just begun.  So it
seems appropriate to raise a number of key questions.  What have we learnt about the interplay
between reform at the national level and negotiations at the multilateral level?  Do the latter
simply harvest the liberalization accomplished unilaterally or can they actually help eliminate
barriers?  What is the value of multilateral rules and commitments? Do they foster good policy
and help improve economic performance?  How much advantage can be taken of the current
round to encourage desirable policy reform? Is there a need to reform the GATS itself to make it
a more effective catalyst for reform of national policies?  Again we ask more questions than we
can answer.  But this paper should be seen more as an attempt to provoke discussion at an
important  juncture rather than as seeking to provide definitive answers.
We begin in the next section with an overview of recent developments  in the telecommunications
sector in Asian countries.  Section III reflects on these developments in light of the current state
of understanding of the implications of different policy choices.  Section IV attempts to sharpen
this  understanding through  an econometric analysis of the relationship between policy  and
performance in Asian countries over the last fifteen years.  Section V examines how the pursuit
of  policies that  have been identified as desirable can be  encouraged in  the  new round  of
multilateral negotiations under the GATS.  Section VI concludes.
II.  OVERVIEW  OF BASIC TELECOMMUNICATION  SERVICES IN ASIA
The number of telephone users in Asia is estimated to have tripled between 1990-2000. Despite
the financial crises that hit the region in the late 1990s, Asia's share of fixed telephone lines in
the world has grown from 23% in  1990 to 33% in 2000.  More dramatically, Asia's share of
global mobile telephone users has leaped from 13% to 35% over the same time period and is
expected to reach 50% by 2010.
The fast-paced evolution of telecommunications  technology has arguably been one key driver of
services growth throughout the Asian continent.  Another has been the general trend towards
policy reform to foster network expansion and the introduction of new services.  Over the past
decade, the vast majority of Asian economies have embarked on a reform path encompassing the
privatization of state-owned telecommunications  operators, the introduction of competition, the
opening of  markets to  foreign  service providers  and the  establishment of  pro-competitive
regulations.
2 'rhe information provided in this section relies on ITU (2000)  as well as various market reports from Pyramid
Research.
3Fixed-line:  policy
Despite this common overall trend in policy, the approach to sector reform and the progress of
reform have differed markedly among Asian economies.  In fact, it is possible to find almost
every combination and sequence of changes in policy in the region.  This is illustrated in Figure
1, which depicts the reform path of 13 major Asian economies in the 1990s.3 Countries such as
China, India and Korea, for example, have introduced competition in selected fixed-line market
segments, while the incumbent operator was under full public ownership.  Others have first
privatized their state-owned monopolies and deferred the introduction of competition to a future
date-sometimes  through explicit exclusivity  periods granted to private investors. This group of
countries includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore. Some economies
have introduced competition and privatized more or less at the same time (Japan and Sri Lanka)
while others  have made limited, if  any, progress towards private, more competitive market
structures (Taiwan and Thailand).
Countries also differed in their choice of the fixed-market segment that was first opened to
competition.  The region  was among the  first in  the world  to  open up  local  markets to
competition.  Hong Kong, India, and Singapore first liberalized this market segment.  Korea,
Malaysia and the Philippines first permitted competition in international services, while China
started liberalization by introducing a second domestic long distance carrier.
The approach to regulation has also differed across countries.  Figure 1 shows when a separate
regulatory agency was created in each country.  It is striking that in a large number of major
economies-including  China,  Indonesia, Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Taiwan  and  Thailand-
regulatory functions are still exercised by the sector ministry or other government bodies. It is
interesting to  note that in several of the countries which do have a separate regulator (Hong
Kong, Pakistan, Philippines and Pakistan), the responsibility for establishing interconnection
rates lies with the dominant operator-though  the regulator is responsible for arbitration of
disputes.
The picture of the state of fixed-line competition that emerges from Figure 1 must be heavily
qualified. Most governments have limited the service segments subject to competition, restricted
the number of licenses awarded or have imposed geographic limitations on new market entrants.
For example, India divided its markets into separate circles and admitted one private operator in
each to compete with the incumbent Department of Telecommunications  (DOT).  New entrants
were allowed to offer intra-circle long distance services, but the DOT maintained its monopoly
on inter-circle long distance telephony.
On the other hand, several countries that have retained their public service monopolies allowed
private entry through build-operate-transfer  (BTO) and related arrangements.  In Thailand, for
example, fixed-line basic services concessionaires have installed networks with total main line
capacity of 4.1 million lines, while the state maintained control over the networks.  Similarly,
3 The information shown is based on the recently created World Bank/lTU database on telecommunications  policy
and regulation.
4under  Vietnam's  Business Cooperation Contracts (BCCs), foreign operators have  provided
equipment,  training,  supervision  and  financing,  while  the  public  incumbent supplied  the
management of the operations.
In comparisons to other regions (e.g., Latin America and Eastern Europe), many countries in Asia
maintain substantial restrictions on foreign equity ownership. In China, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the foreign equity limit in locally established operators
is below 50 percent.  Some countries have recently relaxed this limit, seeking greater foreign
participation of capital and expertise in the local telecommunications market.  For example,
Taiwan recently raised the limit on foreign investment stakes from 20 percent to  60 percent.
Korea increased its foreign ownership limitation from 33 percent to 49 percent.
Fixed-line: performance
Tlhe variations in performance of the telecommunications sector are as great as those in policy.
This may be illustrated by a comparison of the region's two most populous countries.  While
China maintained its state monopoly, an ambitious public investment program led to a more than
ten-fold expansion of the fixed network in the 1990s-from  8 million mainlines in 1992 to  109
million mainlines in 1999. By contrast, India initiated reforms in the mid-1990s and decided to
open its market for local services to competition-at  the time an unprecedented  reformn  initiative
for a low income economy.  However, a poorly managed licensing process and institutional
conflicts between the sector ministry and the newly created regulatory agency caused significant
delays in the introduction of competitive local services and has adversely affected the confidence
of private investors. Only recently has network growth picked up significantly in India.
International telecommunications traffic  has seen rapid growth in the region throughout the
i 990s.  The average accounting rate with the United States of the 13 countries shown in Figure I
fell from $2.13 in 1990 to 57 cents in 2000.  However, lower accounting rates have not always
translated into lower retail prices and settlement rates are still high compared to other regions and
service cost  estimates.  The most  dramatic reductions in  accounting rates and retail prices
occurred recently in countries that allowed international simple resale (ISR)-one  way to bypass
the traditional accounting rate system.  On traffic with the United States, Bangladesh, Hong
Kong, the Philippines, and Singapore have permnitted  ISR.  Forthcoming competition in the
provision of fibre-optic undersea cables is also likely to lower the comparatively high costs of
international bandwidth on Asian routes and further boost international  traffic. 4
Mobile networks
The exponential growth of mobile telephony in Asia can be attributed to the introduction of
digital cellular technology and the opening of mobile service provision to additional operators.
Figure 1 documents the increase in the number of mobile operators, particularly in the second
half of the 1  990s. It is interesting  to note that, unlike Europe and the Americas, the Asian region
did not adopt one standardized digital mobile technology. For example, while major economies
4The  Economist,  December  16'h  2000.
5such as  China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia have exclusively opted for GSM technology,
CDMA networks can be found in Hong Kong, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Several  Asian  economies-Cambodia,  Hong  Kong,  Japan,  Korea,  the  Philippines  and
Singapore-recently  registered more mobile than fixed-line telephone subscribers.  In richer
countries, mobile services are likely to  be a  complementary services, as most business and
households already have access to the fixed network.  But in low income countries, mobile can
be a substitute to fixed line services,  particularly in countries with long waiting lists for fixed line
connections.  In the Philippines, one of the factors driving cellular growth is the popularity of
pre-paid plans. At the end of 1999, over 70 per cent of Filipino mobile subscribers were using
these plans.
Partly because there is less need to protect incumbent operators with state ownership, policy for
mobile services is typically more liberal than policy for fixed services.  Yet in several countries
restrictive policies and regulatory shortcomings have adversely affected mobile performance.
For example, high  import taxes  on handsets in  India and  Pakistan have slowed consumer
adoption of cellular technology.  High interconnection prices with the fixed-line network have
negatively affected mobile operators in several countries. In Bangladesh,  the incumbent's lack of
responsiveness with regard to interconnection has even led to the operation of a mobile network
independently of the fixed-line network.
Asia's  mobile market will receive a  stimulus from the introduction of third generation (3G)
mobile technology. Japan will be the world's first country to launch a 3G network in May 2001.
Thailand awarded licenses to the two incumbent companies through a  comparative selection
procedure.  Similarly, Korea granted 3G licenses to the two largest mobile operators, with
another license still pending.  Hong Kong and Singapore are expected to award licenses in 2001
and have opted for a license auction.  Most other countries in the region have yet to announce
their 3G licensing plans.
III.  IMPLICATIONS  OF ALTERNATIVE  POLICY CHOICES
From the previous section has emerged a picture of "managed competition" in most of the region.
While the traditional public monopoly is becoming a rarity, most governments seem reluctant to
forego  discretionary policy-making and  delegate choices  completely to  the  market.  One
important battle seems to be largely won:  in most cases, privatization has been accompanied by
the introduction of some measure of competition. But governments have been reluctant to allow
unrestricted entry, and in most cases there are restrictions on the extent of private and foreign
ownership, at least in the main incumbent. There is a high degree of variability in the pattern of
regulation both in terms of the degree of autonomy and the domain of the regulator.  Many
governments have also had difficulty in establishing credibility for their reform programs.
Given the current state of understanding of telecommunications  markets, what can we say about
the implications of these policy choices?  We structure our discussion around three general
prescriptions.  These are based on a number of case studies (see, for example, Smith and Staple,
61994 and Wellenius, 1997), but have not to our knowledge been subjected to rigorous empirical
examination-the  task of the next section of this paper.  We also ask: is there a theoretical and
empirical basis to make definitive pronouncements on the implications of deviating from these
prescriptions?
(1)  Larger welfare gains arise from an increase in competition than from a change in
ownership.
A change of ownership, from public to private or national to foreign hands, can bring benefits
even in  situations where it does not lead to enhanced competition.  For instance, private or
foreign equity may relax a capital constraint, improve the structure of incentives in the firm and
serve as a vehicle for transferring technology and know-how, including improved management.
However, private ownership is most efficient in markets where there is effective competition. As
well as its direct benefit in promoting allocative efficiency, competition between firms also has
the advantage of improving internal efficiency. Where monopoly or oligopoly exists, the case for
preferring private  ownership to public ownership weakens considerably.  Privately efficient
profit-seeking behind protective barriers, whether on the part of domesticaily or foreign-owned
firms, cannot be expected to lead to socially efficient results. While much of the theoretical basis
for these assertions is in a static context, there is a strengthening presumption that competition
also produces  significant dynamic benefits through its impact on the incentives to  improve
performance and innovate.
We have seen that while most Asian countries seem to have accepted the virtues of competition
and private and foreign ownership, it is a qualified acceptance. The following questions arise:
(i) Are there any good reasons to limit the number of suppliers?
In some cases there is no choice:  there are technical limitations to competition, such as those
imposed by the scarcity of radio spectrum needed for the provision of mobile telecommunications
services.  In other segments, entry restrictions might be justified by the existence of significant
economies of scale, for example due to substantial fixed costs of networks.  Competitive entry
could lead to inefficient network duplication. It is also possible to think of other special models
of market and/or regulatory  failure where entry barriers  enhance welfare (Laffont, 1999).
Notwithstanding these considerations, entry restrictions are becoming harder to justify in the face
of  technological change  and  mounting  evidence that  competition works. 5 Technological
advances have significantly  lowered network costs, and vertical separation (also know as network
unbundling) has  widened  the  scope  for  competitive  entry  (Smith,  1995).  Furthermiore,
inefficiencies introduced by duplication of networks may be  small compared to  operational
inefficiencies that can result from a lack of competitive pressure.6
5In  Latin  America,  for example,  countries  that  granted  monopoly  privileges  of six  to ten years  to the operators  (if
privatized  state enterprises  saw  connections  grow  at only  half  the rate  observed  in Chile,  where  the government
retained  the right  to issue  competing  licenses  at any  time  (Wellenius,  1997).
6Interesting evidence  in this context  is available  from  the Indian  telecommunications  sector. Das (2000)  estimates  a
frontier  multi-product  cost  function  of the incumbent  fixed-line  operator,  covering  25 years  from 1969  to 1994. The
7The observed restrictions on entry may well be for more prosaic reasons. First, restrictions  may be
designed so that  incumbent suppliers are  only gradually exposed to  competition-for  infant
industry type reasons, to facilitate  "orderly exit" or simply  due to political economy  pressures. This
explains, for exarnple, why governments  have generally  been more willing to liberalize  mobile in
comparison to fixed-line telecommunications  services, because mobile telephony has only been
recently introduced and there is thus no incumbent to protect.  The entry restrictions sometimes
benefit not only national firms but also foreign incumbents, as was the case in the international
telephone monopoly in Hlong  Kong.  Other instruments, such as discriminatory  subsidies or taxes
could be better targeted  to achieve  protection  of the national  firm.
Monopoly or oligopoly  rents are also sometimes seen as a means to help firms to fulfill universal
service obligations through cross-subsidization. However, governments  are increasingly  devising
means of achieving these objectives without sacrificing  the benefits of competition - for instance,
through the creation of universal service funds which are competitively  allocated. In some cases, a
form of "investment pessimism" exists, leading to the belief that promises of oligopoly rents are
necessary  to finance new investment. However,  it is not clear why the market structure needs to be
determined by policy, unless there are some initial investments the benefits of which may be
appropriated by  rivals.  Finally,  governments may  seek  to  raise  revenue  (or  rents  for
politicians/bureaucrats)  by auctioning monopoly or oligopoly rights.  This usually explains the
promise of exclusive rights prior to privatization.  Where competition would be feasible, this
amounts to  indirect appropriation of  consumers'  surplus and may  deny  important dynamic
efficiencies  consequent  upon competition.
Thus, entry restrictions may often be a second or third-best instrument to achieve the objective in
question, but are chosen because of constraints such as the inability to raise revenue without
economic or political cost.  It will probably be difficult to eliminate completely barriers to entry.
But  it  is  important to  determine that  they are  indeed necessary-in  the  sense that  more
appropriate instruments are not feasible. We return to this issue in Section V.
(ii) Are there good reasons to limitforeign  ownership and what are the implications?
Most countries in the region  maintain limits on foreign  and/or  private ownership but it is not easy to
find a sound economic  rationale  for their existence. In so far as the incentive  to transfer  technology,
improve management, etc. is related to the share in profits of an owner, ownership limitations are
bound to dampen the incentive  and hence adversely  affect firmn  performance. Why are governnents
willing to bear this cost?  For three types of reasons. If there are rent-generating restrictions on
competition, then the observed limitations on ownership may seek to  balance the efficiency-
study finds the existence of very high economies  of both scale and scope in the technology used - the parameter
estimates even suggest that telecommunications  in India is a natural monopoly. However,  the incumbent operator
displays great inefficiency,  leading to a 26 percent increase of the operator's cost of production. Based on these
findings, Das concludes that India's market liberalization  program, started in the mid-1990s, is  justified, but he
argues that there may be a need to regulate entry in order to reduce unnecessary  duplication of common costs.
Moreover, with continued improvements in technology, the fixed costs of entrants are likely to fall, reducing losses
of scale economies  and thus increasing the costs of entry  restrictions.
8enhancing and the rent-appropriation  aspects of foreign investment. This argument does raise the
question of why rent appropriation cannot be prevented by ex ante auctions of equity or ex post
taxation of profits. 7 And more importantly,  why restrictions on competition continue to exist. A
second argument is a sort of "infant entrepreneur"  argument: foreigners  are induced to form equity
joint ventures so that local investors can learn by collaborating. As with all such arguments it is
difficult  to judge whether the costs of protection  are likely to be offset by the eventual  benefits. The
final and probably most important reason is a purely political reluctance to allow foreign control of
an essential service.  Again, these political concerns should be less strong if it is not one foreign
monopolist  but a number of competing  foreign firms that provide the service. In any case, there is
so far no good analytical and empirical basis to  evaluate the benefits and costs of ownership
restrictions and how they interact  with entry  restrictions.
(2) Effective regulation is needed to create and safeguard competition.
The terms of interconnection are critical determinants of whether it will be possible to make a
successful transition from monopoly to more competitive market structures.  This is why the
existence of an independent regulator is of such profound importance.  However, the role of the
regulator is fraught with difficulty.  There is a large literature on the problems of determining
interconnection rates that adequately reward the incumbent for the creation and the maintenance
of the network while ensuring that use of the network by rivals is not foreclosed.  And the
regulator must accomplish this with the inadequate information that is a necessary consequence
of separation from the operator.  It is not clear how many of the regulatory agencies in the region
have the competence and the political support to carry out their complex functions.
While there is reasonable consensus about the desirability of regulatory oversight of the terms of
interconnection, there is less agreement on the regulators role with regard to consumer prices and
output decisions.  It would seem that at least at an intermediate stage, where public ownership
and control have ended but truly competitive conditions have not yet been created, the regulator
may well need to defend the interests of consumers.  The task of striking a balance between
providing adequate incentives to telecommunications firms while preventing excessive profit-
making, again in a situation of asymmetric information  about variables such as costs, is far from
easy. And there is a legitimate fear that the temptation of the first best outcome, could well lead
to a third best.
(3)  Credibility of policy is critical
Policies that are believed are most likely to  succeed.  The provision of telecommunications
services requires highly specific sunk investments into assets that are not easily deployable for
other uses. Investors' business plans are typically stretched out over long time periods and many
operators expect to incur substantial losses in the first years of services operation.  Because of
these characteristics, it is important that market liberalization programs are credible. Otherwise
two sorts of problems can arise.  If there is significant uncertainty about policy, there will be
fewer investments and service providers will demand a premium to their returns on capital.  If
' The  fear  of creating  a disincentive  for  investors  might  be a reason  to  refrain  from  taxation.
9policy can be influenced, then service providers may behave strategically to manipulate policy
choices in their favour.
From the viewpoint of governments  that seek services liberalization, the importance of credibility
poses a dilemma.  Factors that strengthen credibility may slow pro-competitive  reforms.  In some
cases,  governments  made  compromises  in  designing  first  generation telecommunications
reforms, most significantly in the form of exclusive licenses granted to privatized entities. These
locked governments into arrangements with private monopolists that proved costly in terms of
delayed network roll-out and/or high prices for consumers. But to accelerate the introduction of
competition or  to impose severe price controls squeezing the profitability of the monopolist
could undermine the government's credibility in committing to second generation reforms.  The
solution may well be to  follow the example of Hong Kong and  Singapore.  Both countries
terminated exclusive rights early but compensated  the incumbents on commercial terms.
However, the incentive to  renege on earlier promises is not  a one-way street.  At the time
governments award service licenses, service providers may promise more than they can deliver in
the future.  The reason for such over-commitments is founded in operators' expectations that
governments are unlikely to terminate network operations to avoid delays or disruptions in the
provision of services.  The experience of Indian cellular operators pointed out above provides
testimony to this problem.
What can governments do to enhance both the credibility of their reform initiatives and the
credibility of enforcing obligations in services licenses?  First, an independent judiciary can be
important  in  resolving  disputes  between  operators  or  between  service providers  and  the
government.  A regulator that is isolated from political discretion and where office terms do not
depend on political cycles can be a way to ensure regulatory independence.  Competition also
reduces the degree to which governments are locked into arrangements with a single operator.
Finally,  commitments to  regional  and  multilateral  agreement can  be  important  means of
strengthening domestic reforms. We return to this issue in Section V.
IV.  ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS
Most of the assertions in the previous section were based on evidence from case studies. Can we
draw a sharper link between policy and performance through more rigorous empirical methods?
This is possible thanks to data contained in the recently created World Bank/lTU database on
telecommunications  policy.  We shall assess econometrically  the impact of alternative policy and
regulatory reforms in 12 developing Asian economies over the period 1985-1999. We identify
for each country and for each year whether the incumbent operator has been corporatized and/or
privatized,  the  state  of  competition in  the  various  market  segments (local,  long  distance,
international, cellular), and whether a separate regulatory agency has been created.  Controlling
for the  level  of  development and  other economic variables, we then  analyze how various
measures of telecommunications  performance are affected  by government  policy.
10One limitation of the present approach is that our measures of policy do not capture the multiple
dimensions of  a  complex reform process.  For example, while the  existence of  a  separate
regulatory agency is likely to be  a useful indicator of a government's  overall willingness to
commit to pro-competitive regulatory principles, a regulator can be ineffective if key regulatory
responsibilities (e.g., interconnection) fall outside its mandate.  Similarly, the mere existence of
additional  licenses  in  a  particular  service  segment is  an  imperfect indicator  of  effective
competition-let  alone the contestability of markets.  Moreover, the overall credibility of a
government's reform agenda is not adequately captured by our policy proxies, but is likely to
exert an important influence on investment decisions-particularly  FDI.
These reservations notwithstanding, an  econometric investigation has  obvious attractions--
especially in comparison to the case study evidence on the impact of policy reforms that currently
exists. 8 We are able to control for a country's level of development. For example, competition
in a low income country like India may not lead to the same level of main line penetration
present as in  a middle income country like Malaysia.  In our panel regression, country fixed-
effects can  capture  economy-specific idiosyncrasies that  typically complicate  cross-country
comparisons. In addition, econometric estimates allow an assessment of the relative importance
of alternative policy reforms and, in some cases, their interaction with one another.
Table 1 presents the results of our first investigation on the availability of fixed-line services.
The dependent variable is the number of mainlines per 100 inhabitants (in natural logs)  We
expect "better" policy to be associated with greater mainline penetration, especially where public
monopolies are unable to meet demand for services. As control variables, we use a time trend to
capture reductions in switching and network costs due to technological  progress, GDP per capita
and population density.  To allow for a more flexible impact of these control variables, we
include a quadratic term for each of these regressors. 9
In the first model specification, our policy proxies are a dummy variable that equals one if the
incumbent operator has been corporatized and zero otherwise, the private equity share in the
incumbent operator, a dumnmy  variable for the existence of a separate regulatory agency, and a
dummy variable that equals 1 if there is competition for local services and zero if local services
are provided by a monopoly. To capture the interdependence  between policies, we also include
10 three two-way interaction terms for the privatization,  regulation and competition proxies
8  V'ery few econometric studies have  been  conducted on the  effect of  telecommunications reform  on  sector
performance.  Wallsten (1999) explores the effects of privatization, competition and regulation in 30 African and
Latin American countries.  However, his study suffers from an imperfect measure of fixed-line competition (he uses
the number of mobile operators not owned by the incumbent).  Boyauld and Nicoletti (2000) provide econometric
evidence  of the impact of telecommunications  reform on productivity, prices, and quality of long distance and mobile
services for the OECD countries.  Their findings generally attribute a positive effect of policy reforms to sector
performance.  It is not clear, however, to what degree these results apply to developing countries where reforms are
introduced in the context of feeble network conditions.
9 Mainline penetration as well as all other performance variables used in this study were taken from the ITU's World
Telecommunication Indicators Database.  Data for GDP per capita and population density are from the  World
Bank's World Development  Indicators.
'° We also estimated a model where the number of years a certain variable was liberalized was used as a proxy for
liberalization of that variable.  For example, if privatization of the incumbent occurred in 1991, then, the proxy
11The estimated coefficients for the policy variables first suggest that corporatized incumbents are
associated with significantly  higher mainline penetration. Aside from the direct improvements in
efficiency, corporatization is likely to be a broader indicator of the public sector's determination
to improve the sector's performance. Among the other policy variables, it is striking that while
privatization and  competition are not significant by themselves, the variable capturing their
interaction yields a statistically significant and positive influence on mainline penetration.  This
finding may have an interesting implication. Privatization alone may not lead to great strides if
the privatized  monopoly is  not  exposed to  competition.  And without privatization of  the
incumbent, meaningful competition may  be  difficult to  achieve since the  publicly owned
incumbent is  likely to  be  shielded by the government.  The insignificance of  the variable
capturing the effect on an independent  regulatory as well as its interaction with other policies is a
surprise, given our earlier discussion. However, part of the explanation may lie in the crudeness
of our measure of regulation.
It would seem that the most comprehensive indicator of reform is the existence of all three,
private participation, competition and an independent regulator.  It was, however, not possible to
include  a  three-way interaction term  in  the first model,  as this  would have led to  perfect
colinearity among the regressors.  In the second model equation (column 2), we dropped the
individual and  two-way interactive effects of privatization, regulation and competition, but
included a  three-way interaction term.  This  latter term,  as  a  general indicator of  market
liberalization, is positive and significant.
Next, we consider the impact of policy on network quality and labor productivity. In columns 3
to 6 of Table 1, our two dependent variables are the share of digital mainlines in total mainlines
and the number of mainlines per telecom worker (both in natural logs). The control variables and
policy proxies are the same as before.  The estimation results confirm the significant positive
contribution of  corporatization and  the  interaction  between  privatization  and  competition
identified for mainline penetration. Moreover, in the respective second model specifications, the
three-way interaction  term  is  positive and  significant, suggesting that  economies with  an
advanced  degree  of  market  liberalization  enjoy  better  network  quality  and  higher  labor
productivity.  In the first regression on main lines per worker, the estimated coefficient on the
share of private equity also shows a significantly  positive sign, but the interaction of privatization
and regulation a significantly negative impact.  This latter counter-intuitive result is again most
likely due to the imperfection of our regulation  proxy.
Finally, in Table 2 we evaluate the impact of competition in mobile services on the mobile
penetration rate (measured by the natural log of the number of mobile subscribers per 100 of the
urban population).  Our control variables are the same as above. We first proxy competition in
mobile telephony by the total number of cellular operators. Column 1 shows that the estimated
coefficient on this  variable is statistically not  significant.  The second specification proxies
competition by the  number of  digital operators only.  The purpose of  focusing on digital
operators is the intuitive expectation that it was mainly digital technology, through better quality
would take the value 0 for all years until 1991, 1 in 1991, 2 in 1992 and so on. The results using this approach are
similar to those presented in Table 2.
12and lower cost services, that provided the main impetus to the growth in mobile telephony.  The
estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level as seen in
column 2.  Adding the dummy variable for an independent regulator does not affect the result as
seen in column 3.  This result is also robust to using the natural log of the number of mobile
subscribers per 100 of the total (instead of urban) population.
To  sum up,  our econometric estimates generally support the positive contribution of  liberal
policy  to  the  performance of  telecommunications services in  Asian  developing  countries.
Corporatization,  as  an  indicator  of  the  public  sector's  determination to  improve  sector
performance, has a significantly  positive effect on mainline availability, service quality and labor
productivity. Comprehensive reform-as  measured by the state of privatization, competition and
regulation-is  also associated with higher levels of mainline availability, service quality and
labor productivity.  Mobile penetration is positively affected by competition among digital
service providers.  Admittedly, our policy indicators are rather crude and we miss important
dimensions of both policy and performance.  For instance, the insignificance of the regulatory
variable maybe surprising, but this may only indicate that the creation of a separate regulator is a
necessary rather than sufficient condition for effective regulation.  In general, our  findlings
usefully complement the evidence from various case studies, since we are able to control for
different levels of economic development and the evolution of technology over time in a wav that
case studies cannot.
V.  DOMESTIC POLICY  REFORM  AND  MULTILATERAL  NEGOTIATIONS
We have now identified some elements of  a  successful reform program, even though  there
remain certain gray areas.  In this  section we address the following question: how can the
GATS-in  its present or improved form-become  a more effective catalyst for reform?  The
Agreement offers:
*  a forum for reciprocity based market access negotiations,
*  rules that ensure choice of "good" policy,
*  a mechanism for lending credibility to current and future policy, and
*  the possibility of cooperation on regulation.
Let us consider the relevance of each aspect to telecommunications  reform.
1.  The GATS  as a forum for reciprocity  based  market access negotiations
A notable feature of the previous negotiations  in basic telecommunications  is that they did not take
place in the usual context of a multi-sectoral  and multi-issue round of negotiations. Although this
had, of course, been the original intention,  failure to complete  the negotiations  before the end of the
Uruguay Round effectively turned basic telecommunications into a  single-sector negotia1:ion.
Despite the absence of any possibility for cross-sectoral trade-offs, many governments withi  no
export interest in telecommunications  chose to make commitments.
13However, as is evident from Table 3, most of the Asian governments  committed  to the policy status
quo rather than to new liberalization.  Hong Kong, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
were among those whose schedules  essentially  represented  the status quo. In fact, several  countries
bound at less than status quo, at least with respect to certain aspects of their regimes. India and
Indonesia, for example, did so with respect to foreign equity participation.  Only three Asian
countries covered made  significant liberalization decisions on  the  altar  of  the  negotiations.
Singapore brought forward its conimitment  to introduce competition  by seven years. Japan raised
foreign equity limits to 100 percent for suppliers other than NTT and KDD.  Korea raised foreign
equity limits and brought forward  the liberalization  timetable.
An important  questions in the new round of negotiations  is the following: how far has actual  policy
in different countries  become more liberal  than their GATS commitments? The wedge between  the
actual and bound indicates the scope for improving commitments without further changes in
national policy. Even though we may not have the most recent data for all countries,  the picture is
not highly optimistic. Significant  liberalization  has taken place in relatively few countries. Hong
Kong and Singapore  have liberalized  the international  segment, India seems to be on the verge of
liberalizing its long distance segment, and both India and Malaysia may further relax foreign
ownership restrictions.  In most other countries, actual policy seems to have evolved little since
1998.
The  new  GATS  round  therefore faces the  challenge of  actually negotiating away existing
restrictions  and not merely harvesting unilateral liberalization  as in the past. Whether we are going
to see a meaningful  exchange of market access  concessions may well depend on whether countries
with a significant  export interest in basic  telecommunications  (which incidentally  includes countries
like Malaysia and  Singapore) are willing to make market opening concessions in other areas,
ranging from agriculture and textiles to the movement of individual service suppliers.  If this
traditional WTO mechanism works, and improved market access in areas of export interest can be
used successfully as ammunition against those who block liberalization of telecommunications,
then the new round may deliver greater liberalization  than has been accomplished  unilaterally.
2.  The GATS as a means to ensure choice of "good"  policy
The domestic political economic forces that lead to protection may also dictate that it is obtained
through  inefficient instruments. Unlike the GATT, the  GATS has  created no  hierarchy of
instruments of protection-although  the ranking of instruments in the case of both goods and
services is similar. Hence, quantitative restrictions, which have been discredited and outlawed in
the case of trade in goods, flourish in the case of trade in services-for  instance, in the form of
restrictions on the number of telecommunications  suppliers. When the rents accrue to foreigners,
these quotas resemble voluntary export restraints. For instance, in the last round of negotiations,
countries sometimes conceded, and trading partners were content to receive, increased "market
access" in the form of increased foreign ownership of existing domestic firms, rather than by
allowing new entry.
While it may not yet be politically feasible to impose the same hierarchy of instruments as in
goods, an  attempt could  nevertheless be  made to  create a  legal presumption in  favour of
14instruments (such as fiscal measures) that provide protection more efficiently. In the case of
commercial presence, a  number of  fiscal instruments are possible, including entry taxes (or
auctions of entry licenses), output taxes and profit taxes, each of which would be preferable to an
entry restriction. In fact, the auction of a quota is analogous in economic effect to the imposition
of a tariff.  1  "
One central issue in the GATS, which has received surprisingly little attention, is how quotas are
to be allocated in a manner consistent with the non-discrimination obligation.  In the past, this
was not a major issue because commitments reflected the status quo and the quotas, particularly
with regard to service suppliers, were descriptions of the existing market structure. 12 But in the
future, as  genuine  liberalizing commitments are made, the non-discriminatory allocation of
quotas is bound to be an important issue.  It may be worthwhile to consider a less elaborate
variant  of  the  rules  in  the  WTO  Agreement on  Government Procurement, which  favour
competitive tendering on a non-discriminatory  basis.
3. Using the GATS to lend credibility to current and future policy
Credibility has two dimensions.  One is convincing agents that current reforms will not be
reversed. The other is persuading them that future reforms will be carried out.
As noted above, many Asian countries have bound the status quo. In principle, a clear GATS
commitment not  to  restrict  entry could  add  significantly to  the  contestability of  markets.
Unfortunately, commitments even  in  the relatively open  markets are  sometimes couched in
language that diminishes their value.  For instance, Korea's schedule says that "a license may be
granted" and the Philippines' schedule states that entry is subject  to a "Franchise  from the Congress
of the Philippines" and a "Certificate of Public Convenience". It is far from clear whether such
approval is only contingent on transparent and non-discriminatory  criteria such as technical or
financial soundness, or whether approval is a euphemism either for a restriction on the number of
firms or discrimination against foreign  entrants. A priority  in the next round would be to purge the
schedules  of such language.
One reason governments may be reluctant to liberalize immediately  is a perceived need to protect
the incumbent suppliers from competition-either  because of infant industry type arguments or
to facilitate "orderly exit". One reason for the failure of infant industry policies in the past, and
the innumerable examples of perpetual infancy, was the inability of a government to commit
itself credibly to  liberalize at  some future date. The GATS offers a valuable mechanism to
overcome the  credibility difficulty. Several Asian goverunents have taken advantage of this
mechanism to strike a balance between, on the one hand, their reluctance immediately to unleash
competition on protected national suppliers, and, on the other hand, their desire not to be held
hostage to these suppliers in perpetuity. However, these precommitments  are in most cases (e.g. for
"  Ironically, the legal systems of many countries allow discrimination  against  foreigners  through  outright  bans and
entry quotas but make it difficult to impose discriminatory  taxes.
12 Thus when Bangladesh committed  to "four licenses issued" in cellular telephony,  the ambiguity in the choice of
tense was not an accident: the licenses in question had already been issued.
15India, Indonesia,  Hong Kong, Singapore,  Sri Lanka and Thailand)  weak promises to review policy.
Clearer commitments were made by Korea to relax ownership  restrictions and Singapore  to allow
new entry. On the whole, the commitments of the Asian countries have made much less use of
the precommitment mechanism than countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.
4.  The GATS  as a forum for regulatory  cooperation
The agreement between a large number of WTO Members to make additional commitments to
apply certain regulatory principles contained in a Reference Paper is widely regarded as one of
the most significant developments in the telecommunications negotiations.' 3 These principles
require that a regulator of the sector will be separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of
basic telecommunications services. Perhaps the most important disciplines of the Reference
Paper  relate to  interconnection. 14 It  is  required that  interconnection must  be  inter alia  on
non-discriminatory, transparent and reasonable terms, conditions (including technical standards
and specifications) and rates;  of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its own like
services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other
affiliates; at cost-oriented  rates; and in a timely fashion.
The adoption of the Reference Paper by the Asian participants reveals both the strengths and the
limitations of the multilateral route to domestic reform. In some cases, the Reference Paper has
undoubtedly provided an impetus to domestic regulatory reform.  The issue of interconnection,
for instance, has been at the center of a dispute between the Japan and the United States-with
the latter claiming that the interconnection rates charged by the dominant incumbent in Japan are
excessive. The question does arise whether the regulatory principles are sufficiently precise. For
instance, what would a dispute settlement or arbitration panel make of "cost-oriented rates"? But
at least the most egregious departures would be prevented.
The manner in which several other Asian countries have adopted the principles in the Reference
Paper reveals an interesting  pattern of reluctance to assume key multilateral disciplines (Table 4).
That  independent regulators are  not  yet securely established in  many countries reflects  an
unwillingness to guarantee the independent action by regulators in countries such as India and
Indonesia.  Furthermore, a number of countries (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines)
have excluded the central commitment to guarantee interconnection at cost-based rates.  India,
Malaysia and Pakistan have also omitted the Reference Paper requirement to justify the denial of
a license.  These departures demonstrate that where there is domestic resistance, the wave of a
multilateral wand sometimes creates only an illusion of reform.
13  Governments  had the flexibility to draw selectively from a common text.
14  Other Reference Paper  provisions provide for competition safeguards, greater transparency and  require the
creation of dispute resolution mechanisms. Competition safeguards  oblige Members to prevent a major supplier from
abusing control over information, or  engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization - i.e. to  prevent a  major
supplier from  using profits made in one segment of the market to subsidize its output  sales in another segment and
thus drive out rival suppliers.
16There is another important respect in which the Reference Paper illustrates reflects the limitations
of the multilateral approach.  The primary concern of the Reference Paper, as of WTO rules in
general, is to ensure effective market access, and hence the focus on the terms of interconnection.
Wider  concerns  about consumer interests and  how they may  be  affected by monopolistic
behaviour are not  addressed by the Paper.  Even though there can be little doubt that price
determination is ideally left to competitive markets, and regulatory price setting is fraught with
difficulties, regulatory authorities in developing countries where competition is slow to develop
need to  equip themselves, legally and technically, with the ability to regulate prices.'"  While
nothing in the GATS prevents a country  from any form of pro-competitive regulation provided it
is not discriminatory, the capacity of most developing countries to exercise such regulation is
limited.  Furthermore, small countries that are supplied entirely by foreign firms may find it
difficult  to  enforce  competition policy.  How  can they be  reassured  that  the  gains  from
liberalization will not be eroded by foreign oligopolies-which  may well emerge through the
global alliances that are being formed?
The current round of WTO negotiations offers an opportunity not only to negotiate away trade
restrictions, but  also to  develop additional pro-competitive rules.  We propose that the weak
GATS provision dealing with business practices be strengthened through the creation of two
obligations.16 The first would require an end to the exemption from national competition law of
collusive agreements that impact only on foreign markets.  The second would create a right for
foreign consumers to challenge anti-competitive practices in the national courts of countries
whose citizens own or control the offending firms.  The second obligation is necessary to deal
with the possibility of inadequate enforcement by public agencies, and already has a precedent in
the WTO rules on intellectual property and government procurement.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Our  review  of  Asian  telecommunications reform  has  revealed  a  picture  of  "managed
competition". Traditional public monopolies are now virtually extinct, and governments have
introduced both competition and scope for private and foreign ownership.  But they are still
unwilling to eliminate certain restrictions, particularly on the number of firms and the extent of
foreign ownership.  The attitude to regulation also remains ambiguous both  in terms of the
degree of autonomy and the domain of the regulator.
This paper is best seen as a snapshot of a dynamic research program on the implications of these
policies.  Even though a number of the most interesting questions remain unanswered, some
Luseful  results emerged.  Corporatization, as an indicator of the public sector's  determination to
improve sector performance, was found to  have a  significantly positive  effect on mainline
availability, service  quality and  labor productivity.  The  implementation of  comprehensive
reforrrm-measured by the state of privatization, competition and regulation-also  led to higher
'5 In many developed country markets where fully competitive conditions have not been established, such as the
telecommunications  sector in the United Kingdom, the final price itself has been regulated.
16 Fink et al. (2000) make a similar proposal to deal with the problem of cartels in maritime transport.
17levels of main line availability, service quality and labor productivity. Mobile penetration was
positively affected by competition, although the effect was only significant when competition
was proxied by the number of digital operators.
While these are useful results, some of the more subtle policy questions must remain subjects for
future research. Four questions in particular seem important. How much is to be gained from
eliminating all barriers to entry when some competition has already been allowed?  How great
are the gains from eliminating  all barriers to foreign investment  when some is already permitted?
How large are the benefits of strengthening  the independence  of a regulator? I-low  significant  are
the benefits of making multilateral commitments with regard to present and future policy? It will
become possible to respond to these questions when more detailed data becomes available and
more observations are available after the point in time when policy changes were implemented
and multilateral commitments took effect.
Somewhat surprisingly, there does not  seem to  have been a  significant amount of  unilateral
liberalization since the last round of telecommunications  negotiations. This might well be because
governments feel that most of the gains have been realized already through their limited reforns
(hence the importance of finding convincing responses to the questions raised above).  The new
GATS round therefore faces the challenge of actually  negotiating  away existing restrictions  and not
merely harvesting unilateral liberalization  as in the past. Much will depend on whether countries
with a significant  export interest in basic telecommunications  are willing to make market opening
concessions in areas of interest to developing countries,  ranging from agriculture  and textiles to the
movement of individual  service suppliers.
If a constructive negotiating climate is established, then there are three other ways in which the
GATS can be used to further domestic telecommunications  reform.  First, Asian countries could
lend greater credibility to their reform programmes by making current and future liberalization
commitments, and more fully adopting the principles in the Reference Paper.  Secondly, GATS
rules  could be  deepened to  encourage the transparent and  non-discriminatory allocation of
licenses - which is often prevented by domestic political economy constraints.  Finally, two
improvements in regulatory principles may be worth considering. First, whether the principles in
areas such as interconnection  can be made more precise so as to increase the predictability of the
policy environment, and reduce the difficulty of dispute settlement or arbitration.  Secondly,
whether there is a need to create rules that safeguard not only the rights of foreign suppliers, but
also those of consumers-which  would reassure small countries that the gains from liberalization
will not be appropriated  by foreign oligopolies.
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the mobile row corresponds to the number of cellular operators in the country.  "Regulation" only captures the
existence of a separate regulatory agency.Table 1: Country fixed effects model-Fixed-line  availability, Quality, and Productivity
Dependent variable:  Main line penetration  Network digitalization  Mainlines per worker
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Time  -0.014  -0.017  0.446**  0.515**  0.047  0.042
(-0.29)  (-0.35)  (2.27)  (3.27)  (1.03)  (0.92)
Time^2  0.011I**  0.010**  -0.016**  -0.018**  0.008**  0.008**
(7.64)  (7.43)  (-2.89)  (-3.92)  (5.82)  (6.11)
ln(GDPpercapita)  5.582**  6.681**  5.461*  6.486**  7.011**  7.721**
(5.09)  (7.43)  (1.79)  (2.34)  (6.71)  (7.57)
ln(GDP per capita)^2  -0.303**  -0.372**  -0.405*  -0.483  **  -0.411  **  -0.455**
(-4.37)  (-5.57)  (-1.96)  (-2.65)  (-6.11)  (-6.90)
ln(Population density)  21.348**  21.489**  1.088  3.123  27.698**  29.055**
(6.16)  (6.22)  (0.08)  (0.25)  (7.40)  (7.76)
ln(Population density)A2  -1.338*  *  1.343**  -0.033  -0.185  -1.692**  -1.762**
(-6.35)  (-6.43)  (-0.04)  (-0.26)  (-7.76)  (-8.07)
Corporatization  0.275**  0.248**  0.412*  0.445**  0.192**  0.168**
(3.92)  (3.67)  (2.31)  (2.66)  (2.99)  (2.70)
Privatization  0.064  0.225  1.336*
(0.11)  (0.26)  (2.28)
Regulation  0.027  -0.054  0.090
(0.27)  (-0.28)  (0.99)
(Local) competition  -0.361  -0.122  -0.326
(-1.62)  (-0.41)  (-1.66)
Privatization*Regulation  -0.723  -0.134  -1.803  *
(-0.97)  (-0.10)  (-2.58)
Privatization*Competition  0.735**  0.991  *  0.671  **
(3.34)  (2.20)  (3.32)
Competition*Regulation  0.080  -0.181  0.241
(0.31)  (-0.39)  (1.03)
Privatization*Regulation*Co  0.435**  0.658**  0.558**
mpetition  (3.05)  (3.14)  (4.18)
Number of observations  161  161  100  100  150  150
Number of countries  12  12  12  12  12  12
F-statistic  104.17**  161.45**  14.04**  23.56**  106.02**  163.96**
Notes: Intercept and fixed effects not shown. t-statistics in parentheses. The F-statistic tests the joint significance of
all independent variables (except the fixed effects).  ** and * indicate statistical significance at the I and 5  percent
level, respectively.
22Table 2:  Country fixed effects model-Mobile  availability
Dependent variable:  Mobile penetration
(]1)  (2)  (3)
Tirne  -.18  1.018*  1.012*
(-1.07)  (2.10)  (2.10)
Time^2  .019**  -.031  -.031
(3.60)  (-1.65)  (-1.68)
ln(GDP per capita)  11.26**  5.371  5.278
(2.91)  (.40)  (.40)
ln(GDP per capita)^2  -.359  -.167  -.162
(-1.50)  (-.20)  (-.20)
In(Population  density)  -66.882**  -32.665  -21.604
(-4.15)  (-1.20)  (-.76)
ln(Population density)^2  3.765**  2.052  1.491
(4.16)  (1.50)  (1.03)
ln(total number of cellular operators)  -.205
(-1.14)




Number of observations  113  54  54
Number of countries  12  12  12
F-statistic  246.47**  59.04**  52.38**
Notes:  Intercept and fixed effects not shown. t-statistics in parentheses. The F-statistic tests the joint significance of
all independent variables (except the fixed effects).  ** and * indicate statistical significance at the I and 5 percent
level, respectively.
23Table 3: Actual policies and WTO commitments of 17 Asian economies
"Actual policy" refers to the state of policy in 1999/2000. Changes in policy since 1998 are indicated in bolded letters. "GATS" describes a country's
commitment  to the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement.
Country  Local Services  Long Distance  International  Mobile  Maximum FDI  Regulation  Pre-commitment
Bangladesh  Monopoly,  Monopoly  Monopoly,  Competition (4  100%  No separate
Competition  in  callback not  licenses)  regulator
Actualpolicy  selected rural  permitted
(mid-2000)  areas
Monopoly,  Monopoly  Monopoly,  Competition  100%  Prospective adoption of
Competition in  callback not  limited to 4  regulatory principles
selected rural  permitted  licenses for
GATS  areas  private operators
Cambodia /1  Monopoly  Monopoly  Monopoly  Competition (4  100%  No separate
Actual  policy  licenses)  regulator
(mid-2000)
GA  TS  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
China /2  Monopoly  Duopoly  Monopoly, resale  Duopoly  0%  No separate
and callback not  regulator
Actual  policy  permitted
(1999)
Geographically  Geographically  Geographically  Geographically  25%  upon  Future  Phased in liberalization of
phased in  phased in  phased in  phased in  accession, 49%  implementation  of  FDI, adoption of
competition,  competition,  competition, 2001- competition,  after 5-6 years  regulatory  regulatory principles
GATS Accession  2001-2006  200  1-2006  2006  200 1-2005  reference  paper
Hong Kong  Competition  (4  N/A  Competition,  Competition  (6  100%  Separate regulator  End of moratorium on
licenses)  resale and callback  licenses)  established in  new licenses for local
permitted/  1993  services in 2003
Actual  policy
(mid-2000)
Competition  (4  N/A  Unbound,  but  Competition  100%  Adoption of  Future licenses for local
licenses)  resale  and  call-  regulatory  services subject to
GATS  back  permitted  reference paper  regulatory review
India  Regional  Competition  Monopoly, resale  Regional  49%  Separate regulator  Government considers
duopolies  (between  and callback not  duopolies  established in  opening of international
Actualpolicy  circles)  permitted  1997  services by 2002
(mid-2000)
24Country  Local  Services 1  Long  Distance  I  lnternational  Mobile  1  Maximum  FDI  Regulation  I  Pre-commitment
Regional  Monopoly  I Monopoly, resale  Regional  25%  Adoption of  "Review" opening of long
duopolies  (between  not permitted  duopolies  regulatory  distance (1999),
GATS  circles)  reference paper  international (2004)
Indonesia  Monopoly,  joint  Monopoly  Duopoly,  resale  Competition (7  35%  No separate  Under new legislation,
ventures in  and callback not  licenses)  regulator  exclusivity for expires in
Actualpolicy  selected areas  permitted  2003 for international
(mid-2000)  and local services, and
2004 for long distance
Monopoly, joint  Monopoly  Duopoly, resale  Competition (7  35%  Partial adoption of  Expiry of exclusivity for
ventures in  and callback not  licenses), entry  regulatory  local services (201 1), long
selected areas  permitted  only through  reference paper  distance (2006),
joint ventures  international (2005).
"Review" admission of
GA  TS  new entrants upon expiry.
Japan  Competition  Competition  Competition  Competition  100% (except  No separate
NTT and KDD)  regulator
Actual policy
(2000)
Competition  Competition  Competition  Competition  100% (except  Adoption of
NTT and KDD)  regulatory
GATS  reference paper
Korea  Monopoly  Duopoly  Competition  (3  Competition (5  49% for  No separate
licenses), resale  licenses)  facilities-based  regulator
and callback  operators, 20%
Actualpolicy  permitted  for KT
(early 2000)
Competition  Competition  Competition,  resale  Competition  33% for  Adoption of  In 2001, foreign equity
and callback  facilities-based  regulatory  limit will rise to 49% for
pernitted  operators, 49%  reference paper  facilities-based  operators,
for resellers,  100% for resellers and
GATS  20% for KT  33% for KT
Malaysia  Competition  Competition  Competition,  resale  Competition (8  49%  Separate regulator
and callback not  licenses)  established in
perrnitted  1987, Com-
munications and
Multimedia
Actual  policy  Commission
(early  2000)  formed  in 1999
25Country  Local Services  Long Distance  [ International  Mobile  Maximum FDI  Regulation  T  Pre-commitment
Competition,  Competition,  Competition,  but  Competition, but  30%  Partial adoption of
but entry only  but entry  only  entry only through  entry only  regulatory
through  through  acquisition  through  principles
GATS  acquisition  acquisition  acquisition
Nepal /2  Monopoly  Monopoly  Monopoly  Not available  50%  Separate regulator
established in
Actual policy  1998
(1999)
GA  TS  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Pakistan  Monopoly  Monopoly  Monopoly, resale  Competition (3  100%  Separate regulator  Privatization of PTCL
and callback not  licenses)  established in  still planned
Actual policy  permitted  1995
(early  2000)
Unbound (for  Unbound (for  Unbound (for  Unbound (for  100%  Partial adoption of  Proposal to sell 26% of
commercial  commercial  commercial  commercial  regulatory  PTCL to strategic
presence)  presence)  presence), callback  presence)  principles  investor, with 7 year
not permitted  exclusivity  for basic
GA  TS  services
Philippines  Competition  (3  Competition  Competition,  resale  Competition (5  40%  Separate regulator
local licenses)  and callback not  operators)  established
Actual policy  permitted
(early 2000)
Competition  Competition  Competition,  resale  Competition  40%  Partial adoption of  No pre-comritrnent
and callback not  regulatory
GA  TS  permitted  principles
Singapore  Duopoly  N/A  Duopoly, resale  Competition (3  49% direct,  Separate regulator  Government  has
and callback  licenses)  73.9% indirect,  established in  announced that foreign
permitted  40% for ST  1992,  Infocom  equity ceiling will be
Development  lifted, further entry of
Actualpolicy  Authority  fixed-line operators
(mid-2000)  formed in 1999
Monopoly  N/A  Monopoly, resale  Duopoly  49% direct,  Adoption of  Two additional fixed-line
and callback  73.9% indirect  regulatory  licenses and "more"
GATS  permitted  reference  paper  mobile  licenses  in 2000.
Sri Lanka  Competition  Competition  Monopoly, resale  Competition (4  100%  Separate regulator
(SLT + 2 Wl L  (SLT + 2 WLL  and callback not  licenses)  established in
Actual  policy  licenses)  licenses)  permitted  1997
(early 2000)
26Country  | Local Services  | Long Distance T  International  | Mobile  Maximum FDI  Regulation  Pre-commitment
Competition  Competition  Monopoly, resale  Competition (4  100%, 35% for  Adoption of  Expiry of exclusivity for
(SLT + 2 WLL  (SLT + 2 WLL  and callback not  licenses)  SLT  regulatory  international  (2000),
licenses)  licenses)  permitted  reference paper  "review" additional
GA  TS  . mobile  licenses  (2000)
Thailand  Monopoly  Monopoly  Monopoly, resale  Competition  (5  20%  No separate  Creation of new
and callback not  licenses)  regulator  regulatory  agency
Actualpolicy  permitted  awaits senate approval
(1999)
Unbound  Unbound  Unbound  Unbound  20%  Unbound  Bind revised policy and
regulatory principles in
WTO commitment  by
2006, conditional upon
GA  TS  legislative  approval
Taiwan-China  /2  Competition  (3  Competition (3  Competition (3  Competition (6  60% (no more  No separate
Actualpolicy licenses)  licenses)  licenses)  licenses)  than 20%  regulator
(mid-2000)  direct)
GATS  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Vietnam /2  Monopoly  Monopoly  Monopoly,  Competition (3  Not available  No separate
callback not  licenses)  regulator
Actualpolicy  permitted, resale
(early 2000)  permitted
GATS  N/A  N/A  N/A  | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Sources: World Bank/ITU Database,  GATS Info-Point,  bilateral accession agreement  between the U.S. and China, and ITU (2000).
Notes:
The WTO commitments  refer to market access and additional commitments  for the respective market segments. Only few countries imposed  restrictions on
national treatment. Bangladesh  reserved the right that certain subsidies and tax benefits may only be extended to national operators; Japan and the Philippines
imposed  restrictions on the nationality  of board members  of certain telecommunications  entities. India and Pakistan left national treatment "unbound".
/1 Not a WTO member
/2 WTO commitment  refers to China's bilateral accession agreement with the United States.
27Table 4: Departures from GATS Telecom Reference Paper in selected Asian countries
Country  Deviation from GATS Reference  Paper
India  1. Competitive safeguards:  No commitment  against cross subsidy.
2. Interconnection:  No commitment  to ensure provision of interconnection  under non-discriminatory  terms and
conditions (including  technical standards and specifications). No commitment  to ensure cost based setting of
rates.
3. Licensing criteria: No commitment  on time normally required to approve application for license. No
justification provided for decision to deny license.
4. Independent regulator: No commitment  on independence of regulatory authority.
5. Spectrum allocation:  No transparency  and non-discrimination  in spectrum allocation.
Indonesia  I. Independent regulator: No commitment  on separation of regulatory authority from suppliers of services.
2. Spectrum allocation:  No commitment  to ensure non-discrimination  in spectrum  allocation.
Malaysia  I .Competitive safeguards:  No commitmnent  against cross-subsidy.  No commitment  on  timely  provision of
technical informnation  about essential facilities and commercially  relevant information.
2. Interconnection:  No commitment  to ensure cost based setting of interconnection  rates.
3. Licensing criteria: No commitment  on time normally required to approve license application.  No justification
provided for decision to deny license.
4. Spectrum allocation: No commitment  on timeliness, transparency and non-discrimination  in spectrum
allocation.
Pakistan  1. Competitive safeguards:  No commitment  on use of information obtained from competitors  with anti
competitive results.
2. Interconnection:  No commitment  to ensure cost-based setting of interconnection  rates.
3. Licensing criteria: No commitment  on time normally required to approve license application. No justification
provided for decision to deny license.
4. Spectrum allocation: No commitment  on timeliness, transparency  and non-discrimination  in spectrum
allocation.
The  1.  Competitive safeguards:  No commitment  against cross-subsidy.  No commitment  on timely provision of
Phillipines  technical information about essential facilities and commercially  relevant information.
2. Interconnection:  No commitment  to ensure cost-based setting  of interconnection  rates. No commitment  to
ensure transparency of interconnection  agreements.  No commitment  to ensure public availability of procedures for
interconnection  negotiations.
Source: Based on a comparison  of the GATS Reference paper with individual  country schedules  of commitments in
telecommunications  obtained from the WTO. (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/servte_e/tel23_e.htm)
Note
Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, Nepal, Thailand and Vietnam have not adopted the GATS Reference  paper at all,
whereas Korea and Sri Lanka have adopted the paper in its entirety.
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